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Abstract 
Though pandemic preparedness has been a focus of public health planning for centuries, during 
which our understanding of infectious disease dynamics has grown, our methodologies for 
managing outbreaks have remained relatively unchanged. We propose leveraging this history to 
identify opportunities for actual progress. We contrast current plans with historical outbreak 
control measures and isolate how the complexities of a modern era yield additional challenges in 
how best to anticipate and mitigate outbreaks. We analyze a diversity of publicly available 
modern preparedness plans against the context of a historically-based fictional outbreak control 
strategy described in Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year (published 1720). We identify 
themes in preparedness planning that remain unchanged from historical settings even though 
they continue to be actively evaluated in planning efforts. More importantly, we isolate critical 
modern challenges in preparedness planning that remain predominantly unsolved. These modern, 
unsolved issues offer best avenues for meaningful improvement. Shifting our planning efforts to 
focus on identified novel issues may greatly strengthen our local- to global- capacity to deal with 
infectious threats. 
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Introduction 
With the emergence of COVID-19, Ebola, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 
pandemic hemagglutinin-1-neuraminidase-1 (H1N1) influenza, as well as the highly publicized 
emergence of drug-resistant bacteria both in healthcare and within the community, pandemic 
preparedness has become a topic of not only scientific interest, but of national policy. A great 
deal of effort has been expended advancing state-of-the-art preparedness, developing 
sophisticated computational models, developing and improving response plans, and streamlining 
the development and deployment of pharmaceutical interventions, among others. Many of these 
preparedness responses, while beneficial, begin building a pandemic response infrastructure from 
the ground up as the epidemic unfolds. Public health planners can draw on strategies with a long 
history of success in controlling (though not necessarily eliminating) infectious diseases. 
Strategies such as vaccination and hygiene/sanitation can be rightly regarded as the foundation 
from which strides were made in reducing the burden of infectious diseases. Other strategies 
have less well understood, or more situational benefits, such as quarantine, social distancing and 
“shelter in place” orders, or the development of social norms that, either by intent or accident, 
serve to reduce the transmission potential of infectious diseases. 
Despite public health being primarily viewed as a relatively modern institution, societies 
have been coping, or attempting to cope, with sweeping outbreaks of infectious disease since the 
dawn of recorded history – the Plagues of Athens and Justinian, the recurring waves of bubonic 
plague that swept Europe, the cholera pandemics of the 1800’s and the 1918 influenza pandemic 
to name but a few. Nor are today’s official governmental plans to help mitigate these diseases 
necessarily new. For example, the word “quarantine” originates from a Venetian policy 
confining sailors to their ships for a period of time before being allowed into a city(1), and the 
  
calls for travel restrictions echo a Florentine attempt to control the plague by banning the 
importation of certain types of fruit(2) and by prohibition of entry into the city of those who were 
visibly ill(3). A reflection on the techniques used in the past to attempt to contain outbreaks may 
yield new insights. It may expose those paths that have yielded the greatest benefits and highlight 
other weapons in the public heath arsenal that, despite vast leaps in technology, remain 
fundamentally unchanged. This reflection is especially important during the present COVID-19 
pandemic, when a combination of constrained supply chains and no readily available 
pharmaceutical treatments or vaccines mean, for the moment, that some of the most 
technologically sophisticated tools used by public health are unavailable. 
One of the best described examples of these older preparedness plans comes from Daniel 
Defoe’s A Journal of the Plague Year (4), published in 1722. The book is a fictional recounting 
of a year of life in London during the Great Plague of London in 1665, the last major epidemic of 
bubonic plague to strike Europe. While not a contemporary account of the plague, though there 
is some suspicion that it is based on the journal of Defoe’s uncle, it is a detailed account of the 
actual public health practices of the time and the methods used to attempt to slow the spread of 
the disease (5, 6). By examining the policies recounted in the text, we can consider whether or 
not current preparedness plans are, in fact, novel, or if there are certain common modes of 
intervention with roots that pre-date not only modern epidemiology as a field, but also an 
understanding of Germ Theory. 
This understanding, beyond its historical interest, may be beneficial to modern pandemic 
planning. Planners can identify areas that have not substantially changed in centuries and are not 
likely to be a source of major innovation as well as identifying “basic” tools that require neither 
disease specific nor modern administrative support. These tools, in turn, are ones that can be 
  
thought of as forming the foundation of a response plan during periods of high uncertainty about 
the biological and epidemiological properties of the pathogen itself, and where more 
technologically-driven and pathogen-specific responses may not yet be in place. 
A framework can be developed for the design of new plans that work on multiple 
organizational or administrative levels and can highlight where modern perspectives, capabilities 
and challenges have resulted in a new environment in which infectious diseases spread. These 
modern changes may potentially have a negative impact on our ability to protect the public’s 
health that need to be addressed, such as the extent to which disparate locations are connected 
through transportation or logistical systems. They may also be positive changes which can be 
exploited, such as vastly improved nutrition and access to medical care, or the development of 
pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines or antivirals. Finally, some of the differences 
between historical and modern preparedness plans may represent a new context that must be 
addressed, such as changes in governmental scope and scale, and the increasing specialization of 
healthcare. It is this latter category that represents a relatively untapped resource for the 
development of new pandemic plans which, to this point, have largely focused on either novel 
pharmaceutical interventions, or increasingly more detailed and sophisticated versions of public 
health policies that have been in practice for centuries. 
 
Methods 
Comparing Preparedness Plans 
To be able to use the insights from the preparedness plan described in Journal of the 
Plague Year, we first need to correct for medical or scientific understanding which has been 
improved since the 1700s, translating the concepts into a setting with a modern understanding of 
  
Germ Theory, public health, etc. We must therefore abstract the underlying concepts to capture 
their intents and consequences rather than focusing on the task-specific recommendations. Once  
abstracted, we can compare the categories of endeavors recorded and investigate modern 
preparedness plans to discover whether modern efforts to produce preparedness plans are 
meaningfully different or whether direct analogies exist between recommendations despite the 
differences in our modern environment (see Table 1). 
In reading both the historical and modern preparedness plans, we discover only 8 
individual categories of recommended activities for effective prevention/management/mitigation 
of disease outbreaks: 1) Designating key players and responsibilities for enforcing policies, 2) 
Preventative social distancing (targeting either A: those already infectious or B: those remaining 
susceptible to interrupt potential routes of exposure and transmission), 3) Environmental 
hygiene, 4) Education, communication, and outreach, 5) Instituting/enforcing boundaries and 
borders, 6) Detection and surveillance, and 7) Protection of/care for response personnel and 8) 
Pharmaceutical interventions.  
In nearly every case, the modern recommendations are in direct correspondence with 
historical equivalents, merely updated to reflect a modern understanding of how to accomplish 
the goals of that category of effect. The only category in which Defoe is silent, and thus the only 
recommendation unique to the modern era, is that of pharmaceutical intervention; the addition of 
vaccines, antibiotics, antivirals, etc. greatly strengthens our arsenal in preparing for and 
containing pandemics. 
This direct equivalence between nearly every aspect of historical and modern 
preparedness planning suggests there is little to be achieved by trying in earnest to discover new 
potential sets of actions that could improve our safety. Even the widespread shelter in place 
  
orders brought into being in the current pandemic are unusual only in the breadth to which they 
have been applied, and the novel challenges of implementing them primarily questions of 
political will and economic consequence. 
We therefore strongly suggest that any effort to design new preparedness plans use this 
framework and, rather than trying to determine from first principles what types of actions might 
be taken, instead simply consider which categories apply to the case under consideration and 
how to respond accordingly in that context. This is not at all to recommend that efforts to 
improve preparedness should cease. Instead, efforts should be based on exploring how improved 
safety and security can be extracted by leveraging the aspects of the modern era which were 
functionally inaccessible to earlier societies.  
 
Results 
The Unique Challenges in Protecting the Public Health in the Modern Era 
Naturally, the question that suggests itself is “Which are the relevantly novel aspects of 
the modern era?” Some of the answers to this question are equally self-evident. Scientific and 
technological advancement are certainly the most immediate changes in our efforts to prepare for 
epidemiological threats. Our understand of how to prepare for and/or affect the course of 
infectious disease outbreaks is enhanced by a number of advances. The emergence of medicine 
as a scientific field, including the isolation of disease-causing agents is perhaps the foremost, 
accompanied by improvements in our understanding of immunology, microbiology, 
epidemiology and physiology, as well as the now-available pharmacopoeia of preventative and 
therapeutic treatments. Science, however, has not provided a panacean set of solutions such that 
biosafety and preparedness are solved problems, or ones with inherently technological solutions, 
  
especially early in an emerging epidemic. As our scientific understanding has increased, so has 
our realization of the scope of diversity and complexity of the threats. While some medical 
advances provide across-the-board increases in health and resilience to disease challenges, such 
as improved nutrition or hand hygiene, few provide such broad protection as to be effective 
against the host of potential pandemic threats we face such that no further effort would be 
required. Similarly, technological advances in medicine have improved the sensitivity and 
specificity of diagnostic testing, analysis of data for detection/surveillance, the scope and 
sophistication of contact tracing and delivery mechanisms for a variety of therapies. In 
examining how the modern era has changed relative to the past in these regards, nothing is 
fundamentally changed – preparedness planning must consider the capabilities and limitations of 
the understanding and methods available for each type of anticipated threat and decide how best 
to exploit the tools available. The tools have changed, but not their impact. 
Another fundamental difference of our modern era is the rapidity of cascading effects 
across temporal and spatial scales, and across different facets of our daily lives. Many of our 
societies rely on time-sensitive delivery of goods or provision of services to maintain safe and 
efficient function. More than any period in the past, a true quarantine that allows nothing in or 
out of any large-enough area is likely to lead very quickly to a practical crisis more akin to 
historical sieges than historical public health efforts(7). This has become readily apparent as 
various state and national-level shutdowns have disrupted international shipping and supply 
chains during COVID-19, confusion and conflict over the import and export of medical supplies, 
and competition at the national and even sub-national level for equipment and tools necessary to 
address the outbreak. Vast swaths of the globe produce insufficient food for their own 
maintenance, even in the very short term. Water treatment facilities require trained staff support. 
  
Even the removal of municipal solid waste often relies on access to long distance shipping – an 
acute problem that emerged during the 2014 Ebola outbreak when municipalities refused 
delivery of potentially infectious biomedical waste.  
Beyond the simple basic needs for safe food and water and a sanitary environment, 
modern risks frequently involve subtle tradeoffs in types of safety and security. Relatively 
innocuous health risks can lead to widespread panic in ways that ultimately negatively impact 
large numbers of people (e.g. concern about vaccine safety leading to recent outbreaks of 
pertussis and measles in the US)(8-11). High economic costs associated with best health 
practices may compromise the safety and/or stability of a population in the slightly longer term. 
These costs range from the economic security of specific industries (e.g. cattle diseases and the 
economic security of agricultural animal farmers (12-14)) to potentially the entire economy in 
the case of widespread social distancing measures instituted at a state or national level. While 
these types of tradeoffs have always existed, the rapidity and scale of their interactions and 
impacts is likely to have truly shifted the ways in which we must weigh their consideration 
against outbreak preparedness efforts. We clearly should not sacrifice public good in favor of 
public health; the difficulty lies in figuring out how to balance the two. 
Lastly, our modern era differs from earlier contexts in the complexity of many 
overlapping scales of governance of the facets of our lives and societies. Many of the historical 
antecedents were based on the declaration of a Mayor or other local official, in London, 
Florence, or Dubrovnik, local level authorities who could coordinate a single level of response. 
Modern preparedness often involves plans working on multiple scales: international(15), national 
(16, 17), state (18-20), and local plans (21, 22), institution-wide plans for schools (23, 24), and 
healthcare systems (9), and even plans for individual private employers. Critically, this implies 
  
that for a plan to be successful, it must survive oversight from and participation by many 
different individual and organizational parties. These overlapping plans require an understanding 
of relationships and dependencies between plans, how they are coordinated, and how two or 
more plans that call for mutually contradictory actions are resolved. This understanding, in turn, 
requires both research and deliberate planning into how multiscale preparedness systems work 
when taken as a cascading network of related plans, rather than a collection of distinct entities. 
Efforts along these lines will not only reduce duplication of effort and help increase the efficacy 
of integrated responses across scales and nations, but also (perhaps more importantly) by 
alleviating the need to coordinate in real-time during the critically controllable early stages of an 
outbreak, we increase our chances of being able to overwhelm potential pandemics before they 
become global crises (cf. the response to Ebola 2014 (30), in which the outbreak was contained 
only after coordinated response following an uncertain period during which individual nations 
spent precious time considering the scale of their contribution to the control efforts(31)). 
 
Modern Challenges Suggest Modern Opportunities 
 Just as these novel elements to modern society increases the complexity of the problem, 
they also suggest some elements of the process that, by definition, are not as well studied in their 
potential for improvement in how a preparedness system should plan for or respond to a threat.  
 Focusing on modern scientific and technological advances is unlikely to yield 
improvement in preparedness planning. It is impossible to predict the need for specific 
antibiologicals in advance, and the urgent need for a vaccine does not necessarily correspond to 
the ease of its development, as evidenced by the long-standing attempts to develop vaccines for 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), dengue fever, or malaria (32-34). Nor does public 
  
health urgency necessarily guarantee an availability of funding for development. This suggests 
that, beyond creating the infrastructure necessary for their development, resources placed toward 
the development of pharmaceutical interventions in any particular plan cannot be relied upon to 
bear fruit, at least not in a timely fashion.  
 Planning for public health response on multiple scales requires a different approach to 
thinking about the planning problem. Rather than dictating what should be done, which involves 
enumerating a list of interventions, it shifts the focus to asking who actually makes those 
decisions, at what time, and what information is needed in order for the decision to be made. The 
basic toolkits available to public health planners are unlikely to change – with some exceptions, 
they have not dramatically changed in several centuries – and for many pandemic scenarios, 
increasingly sophisticated implementations of these same interventions seems unlikely to yield 
improvements in public health in proportion to the effort involved. 
 The question of planning on multiple scales, on the other hand, is likely to require 
detailed, methodical planning. In contrast to intervention-focused plans, it also has the potential 
to vary widely depending on the scenario being considered. Some scenarios may necessitate “top 
down” decision making, wherein decisions are made by a centralized authority and then 
implemented in a distributed fashion. Other scenarios may be better served by a “bottom up” 
approach, wherein both decision-making and implementation are decentralized and tailored to 
local needs, and authorities higher up in scale serve primarily to coordinate and enable to sharing 
of information(35). Similarly, the decisions for some preparedness plans may appropriately lie 
entirely within the hands of clinicians, while others may require considerable input from policy 
makers, politicians, or other interest groups. Even which authorities are relevant may change 
  
from situation to situation, from a scenario wherein the response is dictated by civilian public 
health authorities, to ones where the military takes a leading role. 
 Resolving these questions, over a broad range of potential scenarios, requires the input of 
a considerable amount of research, political capital, societal investment in maintaining these 
multiple scale plans over the long term, as well as a public conversation about which levels of 
authority can and should be responsible for public health decision making. There are well-
documented guidelines and trainings available (36,37) as to how to develop incident command 
systems and emergency operations centers, including the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s Emergency Management Institute, but the implementation of these approaches – and 
their resilience in the face of a true emergency – is highly variable. There are, with near 
certainty, individuals and organizations who expect to be in a decision making role who will not 
be, and similarly those anticipating the needed decisions and information will flow from 
somewhere else when they are, in fact, at the appropriate position and scale to make the 
decisions themselves. Both are potentially catastrophic misunderstandings of their position 
within a multi-scale preparedness system. One need look no further than the chaos caused by 
conflicting federal, state and local-level responses to COVID-19 to see the impact of differing 
authorities acting on different perceived needs, who may or may not be effectively 
communicating with one another, nor necessarily providing a clear message to the general 
public.   
 The need for an understanding of preparedness plans as multiscale systems, and the 
current lack of development in this area, suggests a needed transition towards preparedness plans 
that are not focused on a single siloed set of interventions for a particular disease, each of which 
are in essence near duplicates of a well-understood set of options. Instead, the development of 
  
preparedness plans that emphasize integration of decision making, information providing and 
implementation on multiple levels, which may both change dramatically based on which 
scenario is being considered, and represent an aspect of planning that is not necessarily 
variations on a common and well-understood theme. 
 
Discussion 
Better Integration Planning as A Means to Improve Safety is Nothing New 
These recommendations are neither unique to the field of biopreparedness. They are not 
even novel in the context of emergency management. In 2008, the National Association of 
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) conducted an exercise in Montgomery County, 
Maryland to test a proposed response scenario of quarantine due to an avian flu outbreak. 
Evaluations of the exercise identified several problems that could affect emergency response, but 
highlighted how officials relied too heavily on independent information technologies and 
confusion between state and county roles compromised public health efforts (8). Similarly, 
during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, emergency officials identified the need for 
better communication and coordination between emergency personnel as a critical gap in their 
ability to respond effectively to the situation (9). These are merely two examples among many, 
but the point remains the same: any endeavor that involves multiple agencies, acting on varieties 
of scales, and with sometimes conflicting missions will require substantial planning, relationship 
building between stakeholders, and practice in coordination before all can work effectively and 
efficiently. There are successful examples of this – the San Diego County Division of Public 
Health Services conducted a review of its first experience as a designated lead agency during the 
2009 novel H1N1 influenza outbreak (40, and a series of training exercises in Minnesota 
  
following an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza helped clarify how industry 
stakeholders integrated into preparedness efforts (41. Incident command training should and can 
be done in response to potential threats, not only reviews of emergencies or how to perform for 
the next time the emergency hits. The United States Department of Agriculture had a four-day 
tabletop exercise with 14 states, public health labs, and industry to help learn incident command 
for everyone and potential issues for African Swine Fever (42).  
While this is the first time in over a decade the federal incident command system has 
been tested for a disease, it has a playbook that guides response, policy, and medical 
countermeasures as well as the minimal  agencies that should have representatives and assigned 
key decision responsibilities depending on risk level (17). It clearly states that ‘While States hold 
significant power and responsibility related to public health response outside of declared Public 
Health Emergency, the American public will look to the U.S. Government for action when multi-
state or other significant public health events occur’ showing where strong, clear, concise, and 
effective messaging and action should start from (17). 
 
Conclusions  
Where Do We Go From Here? 
The basic framework of preparedness planning in response to the threat of disease 
outbreaks has not fundamentally changed in over 300 years. In asking various agencies and 
actors to generate their own preparedness plans over the past decade, without providing a unified 
framework by which to do so, we have effectively asked many smart and dedicated people to 
reinvent the wheel without ever asking if we might instead improve the axle. While it is 
definitely the case that involvement of crowd-sourced brainstorming from the modern diversity 
  
of entities engaged in trying to protect the health of the public and/or continue to function during 
a public health crisis may have uncovered previously unconsidered elements for inclusion, to the 
best of our knowledge, no publicly available proposed plan has discovered a fundamentally new 
category of endeavor. We strongly recommend that, going forward, we refine, adopt, and provide 
a single, general framework (based on, if not actually the one here presented) as a starting point 
from which any entity may create their own response plan by effectively filling in the blanks, but 
that the efforts required not stop there. Rather than considering the independent response plans 
from each player to be the endpoint of our preparations, we believe that the completion of these 
plans should be where the investment in active planning begins. We need to foster, even require 
by federal, state, and local regulation, the creation of integration/collaboration plans among 
agencies and actors-both government and industry. We need to dedicate time, energy and 
thought to research and devise a rubric of best practices for how to integrate action plans among 
entities who have not explicitly discussed integration of their plans prior to identification of the 
threat. And resources must be devoted to keeping these plans and their integrations current – in 
many agencies critical roles may be filled by a single person who may switch jobs or retire, and 
in the urgency of an ongoing crisis it may be unclear what resources and expertise might be 
available (e.g. if a local university has experts-or graduate students- available to assist). Too 
often this sort of response rests on the institutional knowledge of a few key individuals, rather 
than in a maintainable and transparent system. The current model of presuming that the most 
critical collaborations will be practiced in advance and all others will be able to act in efficient 
concert together on the fly is clearly optimistic, at best. We need to define rules of play, consider 
the modularity of actions, and the transitivity of command. These critical aspects have been 
predominantly under-studied in favor of parallel efforts to brainstorm individual plans. We 
  
believe that, rather than being the afterthought once the plan is finalized, they hold the greatest 
potential for advancement of the science and social practice of public health preparedness in our 
modern era.  
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Table 1:  Comparison of Past and Present Response Methods 
CATEGORIES JOURNAL OF THE 
PLAGUE YEAR 
MODERN RESPONSE 
PLANS 
Designating Key Players 
and Responsibilities for 
Enforcing Policies 
Explicit designation of roles 
for existing civil servants 
(e.g. Justices of the 
Peace, Mayors, Bayliffs)  
Creation of new civil 
positions in response to 
the threat (e.g. Searchers, 
Watchmen, Keepers, and 
Buriers) 
Creation of enforcement 
duties for both existing 
and newly created civil 
servants in overseeing 
the general public 
Creation of distributed, local 
supply transport duties to 
enable sustained 
quarantine 
Explicit designation of roles for 
existing civil servants (e.g. state 
and territorial epidemiologists) 
Designation of organizational points 
of contact 
Distribution plans for supplies of 
medical equipment 
Coordinated reliance on persistent 
public health-centered agencies 
Creation and Activation of Incident 
Command Systems and 
Emergency Operations Centers 
Preventative Social 
Distancing A 
(Isolating Symptomatic 
People) 
  
Quarantine of sick people, 
their households, and 
possessions 
Altered funeral/burial rites 
to limit contact with the 
dead 
Imposed embargo period for 
use of either public or 
private modes of 
transportation after 
carrying sick people 
Self-isolation of the sick 
Physical-barrier equipment (e.g. face 
masks) 
Encourage healthy behaviors (e.g. 
cover cough or sneeze, 
handwashing) 
Encourage fluid absenteeism and 
sick leave policies at places of 
employment 
Limit contact with animals 
Preventative Social 
Distancing B 
(Segregating Well 
People) 
 
Quarantine of those likely to 
have been exposed to the 
sick, or to the property of 
the sick, but who are not 
themselves known to be 
infected 
Encourage self-isolation of well 
individuals 
Encourage short- and long-term 
travelers (e.g. business travelers 
and university students living in 
  
Prohibition against large 
group activities  
Restriction against the sale 
of second hand items 
Restricted social contact 
with others for those 
handling dead bodies 
Supplies to quarantined 
areas should be provided 
locally, so as not to have 
suppliers act as routes of 
transmission 
Imposed curfew on the 
selling of alcohol to 
reduce public 
drunkenness and risks 
due to inebriation-
associated carelessness 
dorms, respectively) to return 
home  
Employing technology to reduce the 
need for in-person contact (e.g 
telework, online classes, 
telehealth, etc.) 
Encourage healthy behaviors (e.g. 
cover cough or sneeze, 
handwashing) 
Reduction in large group activities 
and/or events (e.g. cancelled 
concerts, sporting events, school 
classes, etc.) 
Restriction in social gathering places 
(e.g. closed cafes, theaters, salons, 
theme parks, malls, etc) 
Environmental Hygiene  Locally administered 
disinfection of any items 
return to general 
circulation from areas of 
quarantine 
Increased frequency and 
reliability of street 
cleaning and waste 
removal 
Increased distance between 
occupied residences and 
garbage dumps 
Allocation of responsibility 
for cleaning of local 
streets/public property to 
adjacent landowners 
Increased restrictions 
governing food safety 
Increased care in 
funereal/burial sanitation  
Increased frequency/reliability of 
waste removal from public areas 
Increased frequency and care in 
disinfection of surfaces in 
public/common areas 
Increased access to disinfectants and 
cleansers in both public and 
private spaces 
Increased environmental infection 
control measures in healthcare 
facilities* 
 
 
* this involves a complicated and diverse 
array of measures, cf. CDC HICPAC 
  
Prohibitions against public 
vagrancy and begging 
Prohibitions against public 
presence of domestic or 
agricultural animals 
Education, 
Communication, and 
Outreach  
Visible marking of 
quarantined areas 
Visible marking of 
funeral/burial workers 
 
Public emphasis of appropriate 
behavioral hygienic measures 
(e.g. proper hand hygiene, 
respiratory etiquette, etc.) 
Discouraged participation in large 
crowds 
Encourage voluntary social 
distancing 
Encourage fluidity in absenteeism 
policies in work environments 
Spread awareness of correct 
information while debunking 
myths and hoaxes 
Update public on epidemiology of 
pathogen, and groups most at risk 
Instituting/Enforcing 
Boundaries and Borders  
Restrictions on 
import/export of goods into 
the affected region  
Institute boundaries for areas 
providing healthcare to the sick 
and restrict visitor access and 
movement of staff to/within the 
facility 
Limit the number of healthcare 
personnel entering areas for sick 
people 
Restrict movement across 
international borders (in some 
cases based on health or 
vaccination status) 
Restrict air travel 
Increase health screening for 
passengers of air, maritime, and 
land transportation  
  
Increase cargo screening and 
baggage security 
Detection and 
Surveillance 
Mandate notification of new 
case incidence to local 
authority 
Engage public in lay-
surveillance reporting 
Ensure local responsibility 
for local detection 
Record and report mortality 
tallies 
Establish triage procedures for 
healthcare workers to separate 
sick from well people and 
differentiate causes of illness 
Establish testing and reporting 
protocols and mandates for 
hospital staff, primary care, and 
first-response healthcare workers 
Send diagnostic samples to regional 
and/or national laboratories, both 
private and public  
Develop, distribute, and deploy 
diagnostic tests that balance 
rapidity of result against accuracy 
of detection (in outbreak cases, 
sensitivity may be more important 
than specificity) 
Establish interdepartmental and 
interagency communications to 
share testing burdens and 
surveillance data for analysis (e.g. 
early warning alert networks, 
incident command system) 
Protection of/Care for 
Response Personnel 
Individual medical staff 
assigned to care of sick 
civil servants 
Provide prophylactic vaccination to 
healthcare personnel if available 
Increase sensitivity and frequency of 
disease screening/testing for 
healthcare personnel 
Supply appropriate personal 
protective equipment, safe 
protocol training, and 
pharmaceutical prophylaxis to 
healthcare personnel  
Determine contingency plan for at-
risk staff (e.g., pregnant, other 
defined risk groups) 
  
Provide behavioral and mental 
support to healthcare personnel to 
mitigate adverse reactions 
Pharmaceutical 
Interventions  
-------------- Vaccination 
Developing and/or manufacturing 
and distributing chemical or 
biological prophylaxis 
Developing and/or manufacturing 
and distributing chemical or 
biological targeted infection 
treatment and/or supportive 
therapies 
 
 
